Spending to Win: Electoral Institutions, Economic Geography, And Subsidies (Political Economy Of Institutions And Decisions)

Synopsis

Governments in some democracies target economic policies, like industrial subsidies, to small groups at the expense of many. Why do some governments redistribute more narrowly than others? Their willingness to selectively target economic benefits, like subsidies to businesses, depends on the way politicians are elected and the geographic distribution of economic activities.

Based on interviews with government ministers and bureaucrats, as well as parliamentary records, industry publications, local media coverage, and new quantitative data, Spending to Win: Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies demonstrates that government policy-making can be explained by the combination of electoral institutions and economic geography. Specifically, it shows how institutions interact with economic geography to influence countries' economic policies and international economic relations. Identical institutions have wide-ranging effects depending on the context in which they operate. No single institution is a panacea for issues, such as income inequality, international economic conflict, or minority representation.

Presents evidence from interviews with government ministers and bureaucrats.

Provides one of the first book-length studies of government subsidies

Explores how political institutions and economic geography interact to shape public policy.

Copyright:

2018

Book Details

Book Quality:

Publisher Quality

ISBN-13:

9781108395113

Related ISBNs:

9781108422321, 9781108422321

Publisher:

Cambridge University Press

Date of Addition:

06/15/18

Copyrighted By:

Stephanie J. Rickard

Adult content:

No

Language:

English

Has Image Descriptions:

No

Categories:

Nonfiction, Business and Finance, Politics and Government

Submitted By:

Bookshare Staff

Usage Restrictions:

This is a copyrighted book.