Agency Theory and Executive Pay: The Remuneration Committee's Dilemma (1st ed. 2019)

By: Alexander Pepper

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Synopsis: This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioral science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.

Book Quality:: Publisher Quality
ISBN-13:: 9783319999692
Related ISBNs:: 9783319999685
Publisher:: Springer International Publishing
Date of Addition:: 12/09/18
Copyrighted By:: Springer
Adult content:: No
Language:: English
Has Image Descriptions:: No
Categories:: Nonfiction, Science, Animals, Business and Finance, Law, Legal Issues and Ethics
Submitted By:: Bookshare Staff
Usage Restrictions:: This is a copyrighted book.