A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian—&“A remarkable book&” (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled &“Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army&’s Conventional Capabilities,&” that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States&’ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author&’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile&’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. &“Gentile is convinced that Obama&’s &‘surge&’ in Afghanistan can&’t work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn&’t turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it&’s time to go back to the drawing board.&” —The New Republic
