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Why 1914?: The Causes of the Great War
by Derek RobinsonShort, brisk and highly readable, this account stands out from the flood of books written for the Centenary of the Great War. In Why 1914?, Derek Robinson - trained as a historian, shortlisted for the Booker Prize - applies his novelist's skills to asking how and why Europe hurried into such a massive disaster. He captures a world of kings and Kaisers, generals and infantrymen. None of them knew what a big European war meant. All the combatant nations assumed it would be short, and each expected to win. The roots of such folly began in the nineteenth century. Robinson traces the earliest warning signs, leading to a sudden crisis and an impulsive war that went massively wrong from the start. This book is the ideal introduction to the key question of the Great War: why did Europe explode?
Why a Soldier? A Signal Corpsman's Tour from Vietnam to the Moscow Hot Line
by David Fitz-EnzHe was one of the best, Airborne, proud to serve his country and fight its toughest war--in the hell that was Vietnam. Known to all as "Fitz," Signal Corps officer David Fitz-Enz served two tours in Vietnam. He was a soldier, combat photographer, and platoon leader, fighting America's cruelest war--from the VC-infested rice paddies of the Mekong Delta to the dreaded Ia Drang Valley, where the enemy ruled the night. Dispensing with traditional, sluggish chains of command, the Signal Corps developed a rapid-response system based on greater flexibility, cutting-edge communications technology, and interdependence between the branches of the military during the war. Now commanders in the field were able to call in artillery, air strikes, and reinforcements at a moment's notice. Fitz-Enz himself orchestrated the first-ever hook up over tactical systems between the President in the Oval Office and a general in the Vietnam jungle. The only book of its kind, WHY A SOLDIER? gives us the inside view of the Corps as it launched an exciting new era in strategic and tactical communications that set the groundwork for all future military operations.
Why Air Forces Fail, revised and expanded edition: The Anatomy of Defeat
by Robin Higham Stephen J. HarrisSince the publication of the first edition of Why Air Forces Fail, the debate over airpower's role in military operations has only intensified. Here, eminent historians Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris assemble a team of experts to add essential new details to their cautionary tale for current practitioners of aerial warfare. Together, the contributors examine the complex, often deep-seated, reasons for the catastrophic failures of the Russian, Polish, French, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, this seminal study with two new chapters provides an essential and detailed analysis of defeat.
Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present
by Donald StokerHow can you achieve victory in war if you don't have a clear idea of your political objectives and a vision of what victory means? In this provocative challenge to US policy and strategy, Donald Stoker argues that America endures endless wars because its leaders no longer know how to think about war, particularly limited wars. He reveals how ideas on limited war and war in general evolved against the backdrop of American conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. These ideas, he shows, were flawed and have undermined America's ability to understand, wage, and win its wars, and to secure peace afterwards. America's leaders have too often taken the nation to war without understanding what they want or valuing victory, leading to the 'forever wars' of today. Why America Loses Wars dismantles seventy years of misguided thinking and lays the foundations for a new approach to the wars of tomorrow.
Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present
by Donald StokerHow can you achieve victory in war if you don't have a clear idea of your political aims and a vision of what victory means? In this provocative challenge to US political aims and strategy, Donald Stoker argues that America endures endless wars because its leaders no longer know how to think about war, particularly wars fought for limited aims, taking the nation to war without understanding what they want or valuing victory and thus the ending of the war. He reveals how flawed ideas on so-called 'limited war' and war in general evolved against the backdrop of American conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These ideas, he shows, undermined America's ability to understand, wage, and win its wars, and to secure peace. Now fully updated to incorporate the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, Why America Loses Wars dismantles seventy years of misguided thinking and lays the foundations for a new approach to the wars of tomorrow.
Why are We in Vietnam?: A Novel
by Norman Mailer“It is impossible to walk away from this novel without being sharply reminded of the fact that Norman Mailer is a writer of extraordinary ability.”—Chicago TribuneFeaturing a new foreword by Mailer scholar Maggie McKinleyPublished nearly twenty years after Norman Mailer’s fiction debut, The Naked and the Dead, this acclaimed novel further solidified the author’s stature as one of the most important figures in contemporary American literature. Ranald “D. J.” Jethroe, Texas’s most precocious teenager, recounts a brutal hunting trip he took to Alaska—in a story of fathers and sons, myth and masculinity, character and corruption. Both entertaining and profound, Why Are We in Vietnam? is an exceptional, timeless work awaiting discovery by a new generation of readers.Praise for Why Are We in Vietnam? “A book of great integrity. All the old qualities are here: Mailer’s remarkable feeling for the sensory event, the detail, ‘the way it was,’ his power and energy.”—The New York Review of Books “A tour de force, a treatise on human nature.”—The Dallas Morning News “A brilliant piece of writing.”—Newsweek “Original, courageous, and provocative.”—The New York Times
Why Are We in Vietnam? A Novel
by Norman MailerWhen "Why Are We in Vietnam?" was published in 1967, almost twenty years after "The Naked and the Dead," the critical response was ecstatic. The novel fully confirmed Mailer's status as one of the most important figures in contemporary American literature. Now, a new edition of this exceptional work serves as further affirmation of its timeless quality. Narrated by Ranald ("D.J.") Jethroe, Texas's most precocious teenager, on the eve of his departure to fight in Vietnam, this story of a hunting trip in Alaska is both brilliantly entertaining and profoundly thoughtful.
Why Britain is at War: With a New Introduction by Andrew Roberts
by Harold Nicolson"If we in Great Britain are resolute and wise there will emerge from this catastrophe something which may well give hope to the world" First published in 1939 as a Penguin Special, this is the original best-selling account of why Britain went to war with Germany. In simple terms it describes the stages of Adolf Hitler's ruthless pursuit for power, identifies his methods of deception and false diplomacy, and details his terrifying use of force that rendered peaceful negotiation increasingly difficult, and finally impossible. Shining a light on Hitler's early life and character, Harold Nicolson reveals the dictator's political theories in Mein Kampf, and explains the strategies he adopted in seizing the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and later Poland. Written with clarity and insight, and read widely by soldiers during World War II, the final message of hope and peace is as relevant today as it was in 1939.This facsimile edition includes a new introduction by Andrew Roberts, best-selling author of The Storm of War; Masters and Commanders and Hitler and Churchill: Secrets of Leadership.
Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)
by Wallace J. ThiesWhy Containment Works examines the conduct of American foreign policy during and after the Cold War through the lens of applied policy analysis. Wallace J. Thies argues that the Bush Doctrine after 2002 was a theory of victory—a coherent strategic view that tells a state how best to transform scarce resources into useful military assets, and how to employ those assets in conflicts. He contrasts prescriptions derived from the Bush Doctrine with an alternative theory of victory, one based on containment and deterrence, which US presidents employed for much of the Cold War period. There are, he suggests, multiple reasons for believing that containment was working well against Saddam Hussein's Iraq after the first Gulf War and that there was no need to invade Iraq in 2003.Thies reexamines five cases of containment drawn from the Cold War and the post-Cold War world. Each example, Thies suggests, offered US officials a choice between reliance on traditional notions of containment and reliance on a more forceful approach. To what extent did reliance on rival theories of victory—containment versus first strike—contribute to a successful outcome? Might these cases have been resolved more quickly, at lower cost, and more favorably to American interests if US officials had chosen a different mix of the coercive and deterrent tools available to them? Thies suggests that the conventional wisdom about containment was often wrong: a superpower like the United States has such vast resources at its disposal that it could easily thwart Libya, Iraq, and Iran by means other than open war.
Why Custer Was Never Warned: The Forgotten Story of the True Genesis of America's Most Iconic Military Disaster, Custer's Last Stand
by Phillip Thomas TuckerFor the first time, this ground-breaking book tells the forgotten story of the true genesis of the June 25, 1876 disaster along the Little Bighorn, "Custer's Last Stand." The failure of the southern column to continue to advance north after the battle of the Rosebud set the stage for the annihilation of George Armstrong Custer and his five companies of the 7th Cavalry at the Little Bighorn. For nearly 150 years, almost everything possible already has been written about the fascinating story of "Custer's Last Stand" except the analysis and new views that have been emphasized in this most revealing book: the true causes and culprits of the bloody fiasco at the Little Bighorn on June 25, 1876 that shocked the American nation like no other post-Civil War event. Phillip Thomas Tucker, Ph.D., the author of nearly 30 books and including award winners, has contributed many fresh and new views about "Custer's Last Stand," revealing what has long been most often left out of the historical record. Where possible, Tucker has relied on primary source material, including period newspapers, to enlighten readers about the most forgotten and overlooked causes of Lieutenant George Armstrong Custer's and his command's annihilation in the bloody showdown along the Little Bighorn. These new explanations and fresh interpretations about how and why the battle of the Little Bighorn,perhaps the most controversial battle in American history, ultimately played out so disastrously like a Greek tragedy. Therefore, the author has exposed those individuals, America's leading military and civilian officials, who were most responsible for the greatest military disaster in the post-Civil War period. Dr. Tucker has presented the unvarnished truths about what really happened and exactly why by revealing the Machiavellian currents and dark threads of a needless war that had been artificially manufactured against the Sioux by America's top leaders, including the president, to gain their territory, especially the Black Hills. Tucker has presented the most forgotten story (literally the story inside the story) of the 1876 Sioux Campaign and "Custer's Last Stand." In this way, he has provided us with a new understanding of exactly why Custer died on a lonely hilltop beside his most faithful followers, revealing the most overlooked truths that have been long ignored. Even more, this ground-breaking book has demonstrated how Custer became the convenient scapegoat for the monumental disaster, while the true culprits in contrast successfully maintained their reputations and paths to career advancement. With considerable insight and a long-demonstrated penchant for myth-busting,Tucker has demolished the myth which stubbornly persists to this day that Custer was the foolish glory hunter, who deserved sole blame for the fiasco along the Little Bighorn. This book has overturned some of the oldest misconceptions and falsehoods to present a fresh look of George Armstrong Custer and one of the most controversial campaigns and battles in American history. For the first time and despite all of the voluminous amount of literature about Custer and the famous last stand, this book brings the reader of today much closer to a more accurate and truer understanding of how and why Custer and his five companies of the 7th Cavalry were wiped out to the last man on a hot summer afternoon in the Montana Territory.
Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? (Routledge Global Security Studies)
by Jane K. Cramer A. Trevor ThrallThis edited volume presents the foremost scholarly thinking on why the US invaded Iraq in 2003, a pivotal event in both modern US foreign policy and international politics. In the years since the US invasion of Iraq it has become clear that the threat of weapons of mass destruction was not as urgent as the Bush administration presented it and that Saddam Hussein was not involved with either Al Qaeda or 9/11. Many consider the war a mistake and question why Iraq was invaded. A majority of Americans now believe that the public were deliberately misled by the Bush administration in order to bolster support for the war. Public doubt has been strengthened by the growing number of critical scholarly analyses and in-depth journalistic investigations about the invasion that suggest the administration was not candid about its reasons for wanting to take action against Iraq. This volume begins with a survey of private scholarly views about the war’s origins, then assesses the current state of debate by organising the best recent thinking by foreign policy and international relations experts on why the US invaded Iraq. The book covers a broad range of approaches to explaining Iraq – the role of the uncertainty of intelligence, cognitive biases, ideas, Israel, and oil, highlighting areas of both agreement and disagreement. This book will be of much interest to students of the Iraq War, US foreign and security policy, strategic studies, Middle Eastern politics and IR/Security Studies in general.
Why do People Fight Wars?
by Alison Brownlie BojangWritten in clear, straightforward language, this book looks at why people go to war and whether it is ever right to kill another person. It explains different attitudes to warfare and why wars are such a major part of history. It also looks at peace keeping organisations and conflict resolution.Questions and topics covered include: What is war?; A brief history of war; Why do wars start?; Why do people fight?; Why do children fight?; Wars and new technology; Colonialism; Exploiting fear; War crimes; Civilians and war; Refugees; After the war; Can war ever be justified?; Are wars reported accurately?; Preventing war and negotiating peace; Resolving conflicts.
Why Fight On? The Decision To Close The Kursk Salient
by Lieutenant Colonel Christian CunninghamThe Battle of Kursk in July of 1943 was a pivotal battle in the Russian-German conflict, 1941-1945. After the German attack failed, the Russians responded with a major offensive and gained the strategic initiative. From then on, the German army was only capable of a series of defensive stopping actions in failed attempts to thwart the advancing Red Army. The inevitable outcome was the fall of Berlin in May of 1945. There were a number of options Hitler and the German high command could have chosen in lieu of attack. The decision to choose offensive action becomes even more interesting upon examination of Germany's strategic situation. Tunisia, the last vestige of the German occupation of North Africa, was lost and Allied offensive action on the European continent was a real and imminent threat. There were also attrition issues, production problems, and differences of opinion between Hitler and key German generals. Finally, the northern and southern shoulders of the Kursk salient, the chosen points of attack, were heavily defended. What compelled Hitler and the German High Command to take such a gamble? What were the strategic issues that guided this decision? Was the outcome decisive? And finally, what other actions might have altered the outcome of the conflict?
Why Gallipoli Matters: Interpreting Different Lessons From History
by Lieutenant Colonel John M. Sullivan Jr USMCAfter careful study of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915, why did the British and the Americans come up to contradictory operational conclusions regarding the future applicability of amphibious operations? Divergent views from the lessons of Gallipoli campaign are the result of three differing operational approaches to strategic considerations that Britain and the Unites States faced in the 1920s and 1930s. The first were different theater strategic objectives that required different operational campaigns necessary to achieve each. The second was different operational experiences, which caused one side to focus on the past while the other to the future. The final was the different means available to operational commanders to execute their campaign.History can often provide contradictory lessons to those who wish to use it to practically apply operational art. Using analogies correctly is important. For the operational commander, drawing the correct lessons learned is made even more difficult by the very nature of inter-service rivalry. Derived from an analysis of the operational art and at operational level of war, the lessons learned from this campaign led directly to the development of sound doctrine, which developed in peacetime was absolutely essential in wartime. Finally, we continue to learn from failure more often than through success, but we must not allow ourselves to be intimidated by failure either.
Why I Love Waiters (Why I Love...)
by T. A. Chase2nd EditionA Why I Love.... NovelAs a member of a covert military unit, John Davidson isn’t scared of much. Yet one look into Heath Kane’s dark blue eyes and he knows a different kind of fear for the first time. John can’t be gay, at least not out and proud in his unit, even with Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell repealed. He’s never been interested enough in any man to risk the fallout. Heath’s hometown wasn’t the best place for a gay kid to grow up, but his grandmother did her darnedest to make it good for him. Now he’s paying her back for all her love. She’s getting older and needs help, so he returns home to wait tables at the Corner Café while taking online courses to get his degree. Even though the Army base provides him with a lot of buff eye candy, he knows it’s best to keep his head down. Neither Heath nor John can deny their attraction, and John’s finally willing to act on their mutual interest. But holding on to each other will mean big changes in both their lives.First Edition published by Amber Quill Press/Amber Allure, 2011.
Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War
by Robert JervisDespite the resources at their command, U. S. intelligence services failed to anticipate the fall of the Shah's government in Iran in the late 1970s and, more recently, insisted that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed weapons of mass destruction. In this book, Jervis (International Politics, Columbia University) examines both failures, and rejects the common explanations that attribute these failures to political pressure and groupthink. Instead, the author suggests that the failures were a result of an organizational culture that failed to look into the factors behind intelligence assessments or to investigate alternative explanations. Although Jervis' writing can be on the dry side (especially in the part of the book about Iran), this his book is an essential read for anyone wanting to understand the workings of U. S. intelligence agencies, or the history of U. S. involvement in Iraq and Iran. Annotation ©2010 Book News, Inc. , Portland, OR (booknews. com)
Why Is Veteran Unemployment So High?
by David S. LoughranAccording to official statistics, the unemployment rate of young military veterans ages 18-24 reached 29 percent in 2011. This report seeks to put that statistic in perspective by examining the historical time-series of veteran unemployment, comparing the veteran unemployment rate to that of non-veterans, and examining how veteran unemployment varies with time since military separation. Between 2000 and 2011, younger veterans were, on average, 3.4 percentage points more likely to be unemployed than similarly situated younger non-veterans. However, this difference between veteran and non-veteran unemployment falls rapidly with age and time since military separation. The report concludes that the best available evidence supports the hypothesis that relatively high rates of veteran unemployment reflect the fact that veterans, especially younger veterans, are more likely to have recently separated from a job — namely, military service — and, consequently, are more likely to be engaged in job search, which takes time, especially during periods of slow economic growth. The available evidence lends little support to the hypothesis that veterans are inherently disadvantaged in the civilian labor market. Limiting unemployment benefits available to recently separated veterans would likely reduce the length of unemployment spells, but the net effect of such a policy action on the long-term federal budget is unclear. There is very limited evidence on the effectiveness of other federal policies aimed at facilitating the transition of veterans into the civilian labor market.
Why Marines Fight
by James BradyUnited States Marines, for more than two centuries, have been among the world's fiercest and most admired of warriors. They have fought from the Revolutionary War to Afghanistan and Iraq, in famous battles become bone and sinew of American lore. But why do Marines fight? Why fight so well? Why run toward the guns? Now comes a thrilling new book, pounding and magnificent in scope, by the author some Marines consider the unofficial 'poet laureate' of their Corps. James Brady interviews combat Marines from wars ranging from World War II to Afghanistan, their replies in their own individual voices unique and powerful, an authentically American story of a country at war, as seen through the eyes of its warriors. Culling his own correspondence and comradeship with hundreds of fellow Marines, Brady compiles a story--lyrical and historical--of the motivations and emotions behind this compelling question. Included are the accounts of Senator James Webb and his lance corporal son, Jim; New York City police commissioner Ray Kelly; Yankee second baseman (and Marine fighter pilot) Jerry Coleman, and of teachers, firemen, authors, cops, Harvard football players, and just plain grunts, as well as the unforgettable story of Jack Rowe, who lost an eye and other parts and now grows avocados and chases rattlesnakes. Their stories poignantly and profoundly illustrate the lives and legacies of battlefront Marines. Why Marines Fight is a ruthlessly candid book about professional killers not ashamed to recall their doubts as well as exult in their savagely triumphant battle cries. A book of weight and heft that Marines, and Americans everywhere, will want to read, and may find impossible to forget.
Why Marines Fight
by James BradyJames Brady, bestselling war memoirist, and Marine officer in Korea, returns with one of his most memorable works to date--exploring what it means to be a soldier and why Marines fight. United States Marines, for more than two centuries, have been among the world's fiercest and most admired of warriors. They have fought from the Revolutionary War to Afghanistan and Iraq, in famous battles become bone and sinew of American lore. But why do Marines fight? Why fight so well? Why run toward the guns? Now comes a thrilling new book, pounding and magnificent in scope, by the author some Marines consider the unofficial "poet laureate" of their Corps.James Brady interviews combat Marines from wars ranging from World War II to Afghanistan, their replies in their own individual voices unique and powerful, an authentically American story of a country at war, as seen through the eyes of its warriors. Culling his own correspondence and comradeship with hundreds of fellow Marines, Brady compiles a story--lyrical and historical--of the motivations and emotions behind this compelling question. Included are the accounts of Senator James Webb and his lance corporal son, Jim; New York City police commissioner Ray Kelly; Yankee second baseman (and Marine fighter pilot) Jerry Coleman, and of teachers, firemen, authors, cops, Harvard football players, and just plain grunts, as well as the unforgettable story of Jack Rowe, who lost an eye and other parts and now grows avocados and chases rattlesnakes. Their stories poignantly and profoundly illustrate the lives and legacies of battlefront Marines.Why Marines Fight is a ruthlessly candid book about professional killers not ashamed to recall their doubts as well as exult in their savagely triumphant battle cries. A book of weight and heft that Marines, and Americans everywhere, will want to read, and may find impossible to forget.
Why Nation-Building Matters: Political Consolidation, Building Security Forces, and Economic Development in Failed and Fragile States
by Keith W. MinesNo one likes nation-building. The public dismisses it. Politicians criticize it. The traditional military disdains it, and civilian agencies lack the blueprint necessary to make it work. Yet functioning states play a foundational role in international security and stability. Left unattended, ungoverned spaces can produce crises from migration to economic collapse to terrorism. Keith W. Mines has taken part in nation-building efforts as a Special Forces officer, diplomat, occupation administrator, and United Nations official. In Why Nation-Building Matters he uses cases from his own career to argue that repairing failed states is a high-yield investment in our own nation&’s global future. Eyewitness accounts of eight projects––in Colombia, Grenada, El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Darfur, Afghanistan, and Iraq—inform Mines&’s in-depth analysis of how foreign interventions succeed and fail. Building on that analysis, he establishes a framework for nation-building in the core areas of building security forces, economic development, and political consolidation that blend soft and hard power into an effective package. Grounded in real-world experience, Why Nation-Building Matters is an informed and essential guide to meeting one of the foremost challenges of our foreign policy present and future.
Why Nations Fight
by Richard Ned LebowFour generic motives have historically led states to initiate war: fear, interest, standing and revenge. Using an original dataset, Richard Ned Lebow examines the distribution of wars across three and a half centuries and argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, only a minority of these were motivated by security or material interest. Instead, the majority are the result of a quest for standing, and for revenge - an attempt to get even with states who had previously made successful territorial grabs. Lebow maintains that today none of these motives are effectively served by war - it is increasingly counterproductive - and that there is growing recognition of this political reality. His analysis allows for more fine-grained and persuasive forecasts about the future of war as well as highlighting areas of uncertainty.
Why The North Vietnamese Launched A Major Military Offensive During Tet 1968
by Major Marilynn K. LietzThis study examines the reasons why the North Vietnamese launched a general offensive during the Tet holiday of 1968. Based on events of the previous year, conditions did not appear favorable for the North Vietnamese to undertake such a massive and risky operation. Several reasons accounted for this decision; political pressure from Russia and China for a resolution to the war, military failure to achieve victory through the use of the dau tranh strategy of war, the increasing inability of the Vietnamese people-North and South-to provide economic and social support for the war, and impatience on the part of the North Vietnamese leaders. North Vietnam's goal was to hasten the resolution of the war by a massive offensive and to quickly bring the United States and South Vietnam to the negotiating table. By prematurely launching this offensive, the North Vietnamese did not comply with the dau tranh model strategy of revolutionary war.
Why The North Won The Civil War (Paperbook Series In History)
by David Herbert DonaldWHY THE SOUTH LOSTWhat led to the downfall of the Confederacy? The distinguished professors of history represented in this volume examine the following crucial factors in the South's defeat:ECONOMIC--RICHARD N. CURRENT of the University of Wisconsin attributes the victory of the North to fundamental economic superiority so great that the civilian resources of the South were dissipated under the conditions of war.MILITARY--T. HARRY WILLIAMS of Louisiana State University cites the deficiencies of Confederate strategy and military leadership, evaluating the influence on both sides of Baron Jomini, a 19th-century strategist who stressed position warfare and a rapid tactical offensive.DIPLOMATIC--NORMAN A. GRAERNER of the University of Illinois holds that the basic reason England and France decided not to intervene on the side of the South was simply that to have done so would have violated the general principle of non-intervention to which they were committed.SOCIAL--DAVID DONALD of Columbia University offers the intriguing thesis that an excess of Southern democracy killed the Confederacy. From the ordinary man in the ranks to Jefferson Davis himself, too much emphasis was placed on individual freedom and not enough on military discipline.POLITICAL--DAVID M. POTTER of Stanford University suggests that the deficiencies of President Davis as a civil and military leader turner the balance, and that the South suffered from the lack of a second well-organized political party to force its leadership into competence.
Why Rivals Intervene: International Security and Civil Conflict
by John MittonRivals – states with acrimonious, militarized histories – often intervene on opposing sides of civil conflicts. These interventions are known to exacerbate and prolong civil wars, but scholars have yet to fully understand why states engage in them, given the significant costs and countervailing strategic interests. Why Rivals Intervene argues that rivals are driven by security considerations at the international level – specifically, the prospect of future confrontations with their rival – to intervene in civil conflicts. Drawing on a theory of rivalry which accounts for this strategic rationale, John Mitton explores three case studies: Indian and Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan, Israeli and Syrian intervention in Lebanon, and US and Soviet intervention in Angola. The book examines a range of evidence, including declassified memoranda, meeting transcripts, government reports, published interviews, memoirs of political leaders, and other evidence of the thought process, rationale, and justifications of relevant decision-makers. The book claims that the imperatives for intervention are consistent across time and space, as rivals are conditioned by a history of conflict to worry about future confrontations. As a result, Why Rivals Intervene illuminates an important driver of civil conflict, with implications for how such conflicts might be solved or mitigated in the future. At the same time, it offers new insight into the nature of long-standing, acrimonious international relationships.
Why Singapore Fell
by Lt.-Gen. Henry Gordon BennettIncludes more than 30 maps, plans and illustrationsThe fall of Singapore, the "Gibraltar of the East", struck by the Imperial Japanese troops during the lightning Malaya campaign of 1942 was a great shock to the Allied cause during the Second World War. No less a person than Prime Minister Winston Churchill assessed it as the "worst disaster" and the "largest capitulation" in British military history. 85,000 British, Indian and Australian troops were marched into the captivity with 50,000 others who had been captured already in the campaign, their fate was to be a barbaric fate in the hands of the Japanese. Their commanders were to be made scapegoats and pilloried for not stopping the disaster, but the true blame in large part lies elsewhere...Australian General Henry Gordon Bennett's account of the disaster is a gripping defence of his part in the campaign. Sent troops who were ill-equipped, with no experience, and little proper training; the Singapore command attempted to defend their position. Impregnable from seaborne assault, the walls, bastions and fixed positions were no help against the inland advance of the Japanese and with few antiquated fighters to protect them against the heavy air bombardment the Gordon Bennett and his men struggled against the odds. Starved of reinforcements, withheld in Australia and Great Britain, the men and their commanders had to do the best with what they had. In this fascinating book it would seem like the island fortress was doomed from the start in spite of the misguided high hopes of the high command.