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Moral Progress in Dark Times: Universal Values for the 21st Century
by Markus GabrielThe challenges we face today are unprecedented, from the existential crisis of climate change to the global security threats posed by aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere. Add to this the crisis of liberal democracy and we seem to be swirling in a state of moral disarray, unsure whether there are any principles to which we can appeal today that would be anything other than particularistic. In contrast to this view, Markus Gabriel puts forward the bold argument that there are guiding moral principles for human behaviour. These guiding principles extend across cultures; they are universally valid and form the source of universal values in the twenty-first century. In developing what he calls a &‘New Moral Realism&’, Gabriel breathes fresh life into the idea that humanity&’s task on our planet is to enable moral progress through cooperation. It is only by achieving moral progress in a way that incorporates universal values – and thus embraces all of humanity – that we can avoid the abyss into which we will otherwise slide. Written with verve, wit and imagination, Gabriel&’s call for a new enlightenment is a welcome antidote to the value relativism and nihilism of our times, and it lays out a moral framework within which we can work together – as surely we must – to deal with the great challenges we now face.
Moral Psychology: Explorations In Moral Psychology (Developmental Psychology Series)
by Daniel K Lapsley<p>Moral functioning is a defining feature of human personhood and human social life. Moral Psychology provides an integrative and evaluative overview of the theoretical and empirical traditions that have attempted to make sense of moral cognition, prosocial behavior, and the development of virtuous character. <p>This is the first book to integrate a comprehensive review of the psychological literatures with allied traditions in ethics. Moral rationality and decisionmaking; the development of the sense of fairness and justice, and of prosocial dispositions; as well as the notion of moral self and moral identity and their relation to issues of character and virtue are fully discussed in the rich contexts provided by psychological and philosophical paradigms. Lapsley emphasizes parenting and educational strategies for influencing moral behavior, reasoning, and character development, and charts a line of research for the “post-Kohlbergian era” in moral psychology. <p>This book will be an invaluable text for advanced courses in moral psychology, as taught in departments of psychology, education, and philosophy. It will also prove to be a standard reference work for researchers and ethicists alike.</p>
Moral Psychology (Elements in Ethics)
by Christian B. MillerThis Element provides an overview of some of the central issues in contemporary moral psychology. It explores what moral psychology is, whether we are always motivated by self-interest, what good character looks like and whether anyone has it, whether moral judgments always motivate us to act, whether what motivates action is always a desire of some kind, and what the role is of reasoning and deliberation in moral judgment and action. This Element is aimed at a general audience including undergraduate students without an extensive background in philosophy.
Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings
by Thomas Nadelhoffer Eddy Nahmias Shaun NicholsMoral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings is the first book to bring together the most significant contemporary and historical works on the topic from both philosophy and psychology. Provides a comprehensive introduction to moral psychology, which is the study of psychological mechanisms and processes underlying ethics and morality. Unique in bringing together contemporary texts by philosophers, psychologists and other cognitive scientists with foundational works from both philosophy and psychology. Approaches moral psychology from an empirically informed perspective. Explores a wide range of topics from passion and altruism to virtue and responsibility. Editorial introductions to each section explain the background of and connections between the selections.
Moral Psychology: Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Bradford Books #Vol. 4)
by Walter Sinnott-ArmstrongLeading philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists address issues of moral responsibility and free will, drawing on new findings from empirical science. Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new problems regarding free will and moral responsibility. The contributors—who include such prominent scholars as Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga—consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism; naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings show that although science does not settle the issues of free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the field by asking novel, profound, and important questions. Contributors Roy F. Baumeister, Tim Bayne, Gunnar Björnsson, C. Daryl Cameron, Hanah A. Chapman, William A. Cunningham, Patricia S. Churchland, Christopher G. Coutlee, Daniel C. Dennett, Ellen E. Furlong, Michael S. Gazzaniga, Patrick Haggard, Brian Hare, Lasana T. Harris, John-Dylan Haynes, Richard Holton, Scott A. Huettel, Robert Kane, Victoria K. Lee, Neil Levy, Alfred R. Mele, Christian Miller, Erman Misirlisoy, P. Read Montague, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, William T. Newsome, B. Keith Payne, Derk Pereboom, Adina L. Roskies, Laurie R. Santos, Timothy Schroeder, Michael N. Shadlen, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sripada, Christopher L. Suhler, Manuel Vargas, Gideon Yaffe
Moral Psychology
by Walter Sinnott-ArmstrongTraditional philosophers approached the issues of free will and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new problems regarding free will and moral responsibility. The contributors -- who include such prominent scholars as Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga -- consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism; naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings show that although science does not settle the issues of free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the field by asking novel, profound, and important questions.ContributorsRoy F. Baumeister, Tim Bayne, Gunnar Björnsson, C. Daryl Cameron, Hanah A. Chapman, William A. Cunningham, Patricia S. Churchland, Christopher G. Coutlee, Daniel C. Dennett, Ellen E. Furlong, Michael S. Gazzaniga, Patrick Haggard, Brian Hare, Lasana T. Harris, John-Dylan Haynes, Richard Holton, Scott A. Huettel, Robert Kane, Victoria K. Lee, Neil Levy, Alfred R. Mele, Christian Miller, Erman Misirlisoy, P. Read Montague, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, William T. Newsome, B. Keith Payne, Derk Pereboom, Adina L. Roskies, Laurie R. Santos, Timothy Schroeder, Michael N. Shadlen, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sripada, Christopher L. Suhler, Manuel Vargas, Gideon Yaffe
Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy)
by Valerie TiberiusThis is the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates such as: What is moral motivation? Do reasons for action always depend on desires? Is emotion or reason at the heart of moral judgment? Under what conditions are people morally responsible? Are there self-interested reasons for people to be moral? Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction presents research by philosophers and psychologists on these topics, and addresses the overarching question of how empirical research is (or is not) relevant to philosophical inquiry.
Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy)
by Valerie TiberiusReleased in 2014, this was the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates such as: what is moral motivation? Do reasons for action always depend on desires? Is emotion or reason at the heart of moral judgment? Under what conditions are people morally responsible? Are there self-interested reasons for people to be moral? The Second Edition of Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction, updates its responses to these questions, taking advantage of the explosion of recent research from philosophers and psychologists on these topics, and adding a chapter on the question of whether morality is innate or learned. As before, the book emphasizes the relationship between traditional and interdisciplinary approaches to moral psychology and aims to carefully explain how empirical research is (or is not) relevant to philosophical inquiry. The bulleted summaries, study questions, and lists for further readings at the end of each chapter have been updated. Key Updates to the Second Edition: Includes a new opening section on human nature, borrowing material from elsewhere in the book Adds a new chapter on evolutionary and developmental arguments for the innateness of morality Expands coverage of the challenges to psychological research, including the replication crisis and the WEIRDness challenge Provides a new section on implicit bias and moral responsibility Offers enhanced clarity and accessibility throughout Includes up-to-date further reading sections and bibliography
The Moral Psychology of Internal Conflict
by Ralph D. EllisPushing back against the potential trivialization of moral psychology that would reduce it to emotional preferences, this book takes an enactivist, self-organizational, and hermeneutic approach to internal conflict between a basic exploratory drive motivating the search for actual truth, and opposing incentives to confabulate in the interest of conformity, authoritarianism, and cognitive dissonance, which often can lead to harmful worldviews. The result is a new possibility that ethical beliefs can have truth value and are not merely a result of ephemeral altruistic or cooperative feelings. It will interest moral and political psychologists, philosophers, social scientists, and all who are concerned with inner emotional conflicts driving ethical thinking beyond mere emotivism, and toward moral realism, albeit a fallibilist one requiring continual rethinking and self-reflection. It combines 'basic emotion' theories (e. g. Panksepp) with hermeneutic depth psychology. The result is a realist approach to moral thinking emphasizing coherence rather than foundationalist theory of knowledge.
Moral Psychology, Volume 5: Virtue and Character (Bradford Bks.)
by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Christian MillerGroundbreaking essays and commentaries on the ways that recent findings in psychology and neuroscience illuminate virtue and character and related issues in philosophy.Philosophers have discussed virtue and character since Socrates, but many traditional views have been challenged by recent findings in psychology and neuroscience. This fifth volume of Moral Psychology grows out of this new wave of interdisciplinary work on virtue, vice, and character. It offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate virtue and character and related issues in moral philosophy. The contributors discuss such topics as eliminativist and situationist challenges to character; investigate the conceptual and empirical foundations of self-control, honesty, humility, and compassion; and consider whether the virtues contribute to well-being.ContributorsKarl Aquino, Jason Baehr, C. Daniel Batson, Lorraine L. Besser, C. Daryl Cameron, Tanya L. Chartrand, M. J. Crockett, Bella DePaulo, Korrina A. Duffy, William Fleeson, Andrea L. Glenn, Charles Goodman, Geoffrey P. Goodwin, George Graham, June Gruber, Thomas Hurka, Eranda Jayawickreme, Andreas Kappes, Kristján Kristjánsson, Daniel Lapsley, Neil Levy, E.J. Masicampo, Joshua May, Christian B. Miller, M. A. Montgomery, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, Hanna Pickard, Katie Rapier, Raul Saucedo, Shannon W. Schrader, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Nancy E. Snow, Gopal Sreenivasan, Chandra Sripada, June P. Tangney, Valerie Tiberius, Simine Vazire, Jennifer Cole Wright
The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics #119)
by Christian Reus-SmitThis book seeks to explain why different systems of sovereign states have built different types of fundamental institutions to govern interstate relations. Why, for example, did the ancient Greeks operate a successful system of third-party arbitration, while international society today rests on a combination of international law and multilateral diplomacy? Why did the city-states of Renaissance Italy develop a system of oratorical diplomacy, while the states of absolutist Europe relied on naturalist international law and "old diplomacy"? Conventional explanations of basic institutional practices have difficulty accounting for such variation. Christian Reus-Smit addresses this problem by presenting an alternative, "constructivist" theory of international institutional development, one that emphasizes the relationship between the social identity of the state and the nature and origin of basic institutional practices. Reus-Smit argues that international societies are shaped by deep constitutional structures that are based on prevailing beliefs about the moral purpose of the state, the organizing principle of sovereignty, and the norm of procedural justice. These structures inform the imaginations of institutional architects as they develop and adjust institutional arrangements between states. As he shows with detailed reference to ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, absolutist Europe, and the modern world, different cultural and historical contexts lead to profoundly different constitutional structures and institutional practices. The first major study of its kind, this book is a significant addition to our theoretical and empirical understanding of international relations, past and present.
Moral Realism: A Defence
by Russ Shafer-LandauMoral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
Moral Realities: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology
by Mark PlattsFirst published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences (Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory)
by Thomas PölzlerAre there objective moral truths (things that are morally right or wrong independently of what anybody thinks about them)? To answer this question more and more scholars have recently begun to appeal to evidence from scientific disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, biology, and anthropology. This book investigates this novel scientific approach in a comprehensive, empirically focused, partly clarificatory, and partly metatheoretical way. It argues for two main theses. First, it is possible for the empirical sciences to contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism debate. And second, most appeals to science that have so far been proposed are insufficiently empirically substantiated. The book’s main chapters address four prominent science-based arguments for or against the existence of objective moral truths: the presumptive argument, the argument from moral disagreement, the sentimentalist argument, and the evolutionary debunking argument. For each of these arguments Thomas Pölzler first identifies the sense in which its underlying empirical hypothesis would have to be true in order for the argument to work. Then he shows that the available scientific evidence fails to support this hypothesis. Finally, he also makes suggestions as to how to test the hypothesis more validly in future scientific research. Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences is an important contribution to the moral realism/anti-realism debate that will appeal both to philosophers and scientists interested in moral psychology and metaethics.
Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World
by Patricia MarinoMoral diversity is a fundamental reality of today's world, but moral theorists have difficulty responding to it. Some take it as evidence for skepticism - the view that there are no moral truths. <P><P>Others, associating moral reasoning with the search for overarching principles and unifying values, see it as the result of error. In the former case, moral reasoning is useless, since values express individual preferences; in the latter, our reasoning process is dramatically at odds with our lived experience. Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World takes a different approach, proposing an alternative way of thinking about moral reasoning and progress by showing how diversity and disagreement are compatible with theorizing and justification. Patricia Marino demonstrates that, instead of being evidence for skepticism and error, moral disagreements often arise because we value things pluralistically. This means that although people share multiple values such as fairness, honesty, loyalty, and benevolence, we interpret and prioritize those values in various ways. Given this pluralistic evaluation process, preferences for unified single-principle theories are not justified. Focusing on finding moral compromises, prioritizing conflicting values, and judging consistently from one case to another, Marino elaborates her ideas in terms of real-life dilemmas, arguing that the moral complexity and conflict we so often encounter can be part of fruitful and logical moral reflection. Aiming to draw new connections and bridge the gap between theoretical ethics and applied ethics, Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World offers a sophisticated set of philosophical arguments on moral reasoning and pluralism with real world applications.
Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World
by Patricia MarinoMoral diversity is a fundamental reality of today’s world, but moral theorists have difficulty responding to it. Some take it as evidence for skepticism – the view that there are no moral truths. Others, associating moral reasoning with the search for overarching principles and unifying values, see it as the result of error. In the former case, moral reasoning is useless, since values express individual preferences; in the latter, our reasoning process is dramatically at odds with our lived experience. Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World takes a different approach, proposing an alternative way of thinking about moral reasoning and progress by showing how diversity and disagreement are compatible with theorizing and justification. Patricia Marino demonstrates that, instead of being evidence for skepticism and error, moral disagreements often arise because we value things pluralistically. This means that although people share multiple values such as fairness, honesty, loyalty, and benevolence, we interpret and prioritize those values in various ways. Given this pluralistic evaluation process, preferences for unified single-principle theories are not justified. Focusing on finding moral compromises, prioritizing conflicting values, and judging consistently from one case to another, Marino elaborates her ideas in terms of real-life dilemmas, arguing that the moral complexity and conflict we so often encounter can be part of fruitful and logical moral reflection. Aiming to draw new connections and bridge the gap between theoretical ethics and applied ethics, Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World offers a sophisticated set of philosophical arguments on moral reasoning and pluralism with real world applications.
Moral Reasoning Vol 2 (Studies In Ethics And The Philosophy Of Religion)
by R. W. BeardsmoreFirst published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Moral Relativism: A Short Introduction
by Neil LevyThis enlightening new introduction examines the history and development of moral relativism, considering the arguments for and against, and also covering such key topics as terrorism, and the rights of women in oppressive cultures.
Moral Relativism
by Steven LukesMoral relativism attracts and repels. What is defensible in it and what is to be rejected? Do we as human beings have no shared standards by which we can understand one another? Can we abstain from judging one another's practices? Do we truly have divergent views about what constitutes good and evil, virtue and vice, harm and welfare, dignity and humiliation, or is there some underlying commonality that trumps it all? These questions turn up everywhere, from Montaigne's essay on cannibals, to the UN Declaration of Human Rights, to the debate over female genital mutilation. They become ever more urgent with the growth of mass immigration, the rise of religious extremism, the challenges of Islamist terrorism, the rise of identity politics, and the resentment at colonialism and the massive disparities of wealth and power between North and South. Are human rights and humanitarian interventions just the latestform of cultural imperialism? By what right do we judge particular practices as barbaric? Who are the real barbarians? In this provocative new book, the distinguished social theorist Steven Lukes takes an incisive and enlightening look at these and other challenging questions and considers the very foundations of what we believe, why we believe it, and whether there is a profound discord between "us" and "them. "
Moral Relativism and Chinese Philosophy: David Wong and His Critics (SUNY series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture)
by Yang Xiao and Yong HuangOriginal, influential, and often controversial, ethicist David Wong defends forms of moral relativism. His 1984 Moral Relativity was a study of this concept, and his 2006 Natural Moralities presented a new and sophisticated account of it. Wong's vision is of a pluralistic moral relativism; he does not defend all forms of relativism but evaluates what moralities may be true. His singular philosophy reflects his deep knowledge of Confucian and Daoist thought.In this book, moral philosophers and scholars of Chinese thought debate ideas central to Wong's work and Wong responds to them. The discussion ranges widely, including exploring Wong's thought on naturalism, criteria for moralities, the principle of charity, moral authority, and the concept of community, and looking at his readings of Xunzi and Zhuangzi. Wong's nuanced and forceful responses clarify and develop further arguments in his work. These engaging and critical exchanges between Wong and his critics illuminate not only Wong's thought, but also contemporary ethical theory and Chinese philosophy.
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity
by Gilbert Harman Judith J. ThomsonDo moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost. Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.
Moral Relativism and Pluralism (Elements in Ethics)
by David B. WongThe argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting and abortion.
Moral Relativism and Reasons for Action
by Robert StreifferOriginally published in 2003, this book examines moral relativism and the author discusses the main arguments for Appraiser Relativism and Agent Relativism. The final chapter of the book discusses the implication of some recent developments in metaethics and develops a theory of reasons for action based on the way in which an action can be good as an alternative to the desire-based, agent-centred account critiqued in the earlier chapters.
Moral Relativity
by David B. WongThis title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1984.
Moral Respect, Objectification, and Health Care
by Meredith Celene SchwartzThis book fills an important gap in existing health care ethics literature by describing an egalitarian conception of moral respect which applies to autonomous and non-autonomous patients alike. It reframes questions about respect, from its target to the role that respect plays in our moral lives. Taking into account various forms of objectification, it suggests that the unique role of moral respect is to recognize a person as more than a mere object; to recognize them as an equally intrinsically valuable being who possesses dignity. Further, the book argues that respect is central to health care because medicine and experiences of illness are both inherently objectifying. Objectification is sometimes morally permissible, and other times morally troubling—a context of respect can help to distinguish between these situations. Because we can reduce others to mere objects in ways other than violating or denying their autonomy, the approach presented here can also accommodate non-autonomous patients directly without considering them as marginal cases.